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Introduction 
 
This article will focus on the issue of steering higher education in public systems. 
First, we shall present some of the results of the empirical studies we carried out in 
France and Germany at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s on the bodies that 
are responsible for higher education. We shall thus be able to show that there is a 
specific (national) type of relation between the state bodies and the universities in 
each country and that it differs greatly. Hence, we shall argue that State/universities 
interactions have national bases that must not be seen in terms of culture, but rather 
as societal (in the sense of Maurice et a/., 1982) constructions of relationships. 
Yet, even if rather stable modes of regulation can be found in these interactions, 
changes may occur. In the second part, we shall present a policy developed in 
France, as from 1989, to change the nature of the relations between the State and the 
universities by funding through negotiation (contractualisation) certain exchanges 
between the different partners. We shall use these recent French developments to 
reflect on how the higher education systems may be changed. 
 
Steering Higher Education in France (before 1989) and in Germany 
 
Erhard Friedberg and I came to the issue of the intervention of the State in higher 
education after a first comparative empirical study on two French and two German 
universities in which we examined the relations between the faculty members and 
the administration, the ways in which decisions were taken (especially by the official 
university bodies), and resources were allocated. First, our findings showed that 
German professors identified strongly with their institutions and considered their 
university as an entity to which they were committed and loyal. This is much less the 
case with French academics. Second, German decision-making committees are much 
more respected than their French counterparts. They are indeed 'able' to take 
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decisions, to ask for changes, or even, in some cases, to reject a project proposed by 
the departments. 
 
One of the explanations we found for these differences was the way in which faculty 
are recruited. In Germany, the recruitment of a professor leads to bargaining 
procedures1 that mainly concern the amount of resources the professor will receive 
for teaching and research. In other words, the university invests in a faculty member 
and, in return, the latter is more committed to his institution. Hence, we stated that 
the types of relations that exist between the university and the academic profession 
(as a market-place) influence the internal functioning of the university structures 
(Musselin, 1987; Friedberg & Musselin, 1989a,b). 
This led to a second wave of field work. If there is close interaction between the 
university and the faculty, then state intervention in higher education has to deal with 
this dual aspect: universities on the one side, and the academic profession on the 
other. This is why we studied the French and German state bodies responsible for 
steering higher education: the central administration in France and the Land agencies 
in Germany2. We therefore carried out a first study on the French bodies in 1987 and 
the same study in 1988 and 1989 in regional Ministries (Landministerium fur 
Wissenschaft und Kunst) in Germany and then compared the two (Friedberg & 
Musselin, 1992, 1993; Musselin et al., 1993; Musselin, 1992). 
 
Brief Presentation of the Competencies of State Bodies Responsible for Higher 
Education in France and Germany 
 
Having given the background to this empirical work, we shall now very briefly 
describe the state bodies in France and Germany to stress the differences between the 
two countries. 
In France, the loi de décentralisation of 1982 did not concern higher education, 
which remained under the control of the State: no responsibilities were given to the 
local governments3. In 1987, when we carried out our first study, universities were 
under the direct responsibility of the Ministry for Research and Higher Education. 
The management of French universities was entrusted to five directorates, overseen 
by a general directorate (DGESR, General Directorate for Higher Education and 
Research): the DESUP (Directorate for Higher Education) whose two main functions 
were the agreement on curricula (habilitation) leading to national diplomas4 and the 
planning of the development of universities; the DPES (Directorate for Higher 
Education Staff); the SAF (Service for Administration and Budgets) that allocated 
financial resources based on impersonal criteria5; the DR (Directorate for 
Research)6; and the Directorate for University Libraries. 
In Germany, responsibility for higher education is shared between the Federal State 
(Bund) and the local States (Länder). The first defines the general framework 
whereby the Länder can develop their regional law on higher education. The Bund is 
also involved for 50% in the decisions and in the funding of new buildings, new 
campuses and heavy science equipment. But each Land is responsible for the 
allocation of budgets and positions and for agreements on new curricula. It is also 
involved in the recruitment of professors. The formal structures of each 
Landministerium für Wissenschaft und Kunst differ but, in addition to the classical 
responsibilities, such as 'staff', 'budgeting', 'higher training' and 'research activities', 
there is a division between administrators called Hochschulreferenten (literally 
'university correspondents'), who are responsible for a specific university and who 
act as 'go-betweens' with the Ministry, and the universities. 
 
Hoping that this brief overview of the formal structure in each country will suffice, 
we shall now summarise the main results of our field work in both countries. 
 
A Logic by Discipline in France / A Logic by Organisation (University) in 
Germany 
 
In the first research we carried out on universities, we stressed the weak governing 
ability of French universities (Musselin, 1987; Friedberg & Musselin, 1989a). The 
study of state bodies led us to the conclusion that this weakness was somewhat 
reinforced by a central administration that 'denied' the existence of 'universities' in 
France. The formal structure of the Ministry, internal procedures, the relations 
between the different offices and between the directorates split the universities into 
different problem areas (training, staff, budgeting, research, libraries) and, within 
these, into disciplines (thus, for instance, in the DPES, one office was responsible for 
the faculty staff in humanities, the other for the faculty staff in science). Nowhere 
was a university considered as an entity. In this fragmented structure, the dominating 
logic of action7 was based on the habilitation of curricula: resources to be allocated 
(present or future) were calculated according to the habilitations of diplomas and 
budget increases were generally based on the creation of new curricula. As the 
procedures for these habilitations were discipline-based, the calculation of the 
budgets was also discipline-based. Therefore, to reflect on the university as a whole 
made no sense, when reasoning by disciplines and cycles8 was the norm. In a way, 
except for the resources based on square metres, a university budget was no more 
than the sum of the resources allocated (through bureaucratic criteria) to each 
curriculum after habilitation. 
Conversely, universities in Germany are fairly integrated organisations, with a 
stronger institutional position9, and are considered true partners by the Ministry. The 
Hochschulreferent plays a crucial role in interactions between the ministry offices 
and the university. He has usually known 'his' university for many years and, when 
the president presents him with a project that has been agreed upon by the university 
decision-making committees, he defends it before the other ministry offices10 that 
manage the necessary resources (research funds, budget, positions). He also 
'transmits' the ministry policy to the university. He is where the different aspects of 
university management converge. The logic of the disciplines is therefore much 
weaker than in France. 
 
Administration and the Academic Profession 
 
A second important difference between the two countries lies in the interplay 
between the State and the academic profession in decision-making. 
The description above of the French system corresponds to the traditional 
representation of France as a centralised country. And so it is. But centralisation does 
not mean that the state bodies are in a strong position. In fact, most of the crucial 
decisions taken by the central administration (i. e. decisions concerning the 
habilitation of curricula, positions, research funds, etc.) are submitted to experts of 
the various disciplines who are chosen by the Ministry11. The evaluations and advice 
given by these experts, who belong to the academic profession, are the basis on 
which the administration12 makes its decisions. The influence of the administrative 
staff is thus rather weak: they have very limited legitimacy and try to gain more by 
basing their decisions on the advice of scientific advisers13. 
 
This seemed so 'normal' to us that, when we interviewed German administrative staff 
in the Landministerfum, we were very surprised by the absence of academic experts 
on whose expertise one could rely to take decisions. There are almost no relations 
between the Ministry of the Land and the German academic profession in matters of 
decision-making concerning positions, curricula or research. But conversely, the 
Ministry has a rather direct influence on the state of the academic market-place, 
since it participates in recruitments by allocating (or not) extra funding to the 
university that wants to 'attract' an eminent faculty member with a large recruitment 
budget. The Hochschulreferent assesses the selected candidate and decides whether 
it is worth proposing him an attractive offer14. Hence, the interplay between the State 
and the profession differs from one country to another (Musselin, 1994) and the 
independence of the administration vis-à-vis the academic profession may vary 
considerably. 
 
Synoptical Decision-making in France / 'Case by Case' Decision-making in 
Germany 
 
The third main characteristic of state intervention is the basis on which decisions are 
taken. 
In France, most of the procedures were synoptical, i. e. decision-making was 
organised in national procedures that, in theory, allowed for comparisons between 
similar situations. All was structured so that state bodies could manage such 
comparisons with the help of the academic experts. Let us take the case of the 
habilitations for curricula until 1989. Every four years, each diploma in the same 
type of discipline was examined simultaneously with the same diplomas of the same 
discipline in all universities. For instance, every licence in science was evaluated for 
habilitation or re-habilitation. The comparison of the situations, not the specificity 
of each situation, led to decisions. Thus, work in the state bodies was organised 
around a double periodicity. An annual one that concerned budgets, the publication 
of positions, recruitment and promotion bodies, and the suppression, creation, and 
vacancy of positions and one every four years which concerned the habilitation of 
curricula and university research funds. 
The formal structure we described above was rather appropriate for such synoptical 
decision-making, since it allowed to make choices out of context. Because the 
management of the universities was split into directorates that had their own sector 
of activities and responsibility, each specialised office (for example, that of the 
science faculty members) was not really in a position to take into account the impact 
of its decisions on other domains (for example, the effects of the vacancy of a 
position on a curriculum or on research in the university concerned). The margin for 
comparison mainly concerned its specific area of responsibility (i. e. in this case staff 
and positions in science) and all the more so, since the number of management 
applications15 for the whole of France did not really allow to take into consideration 
the competing interests of each university. Thus, the specificity of each situation 
disappeared behind a formal structure that divided the reality into areas of 
responsibility without allowing for the emergence of poles of decision that could 
integrate the interests of the universities and those of the Ministry. Nobody was able 
to assume the complex context of a particular issue. The compartmentalisation 
created by the dispatching of responsibility, the number of files to be processed, and 
the respect of national norms, everything converged to justify a synoptical way of 
taking decisions. 
 
In Germany, on the contrary, decision-making is primarily non-synoptical. Case-by-
case decision-taking prevails. There are no planned re-examinations of the curricula 
and no federal procedures that deal with all recruitments simultaneously 
(recruitments occur when a position becomes vacant). Each request project from a 
university is examined for itself. The criteria to take decisions are centred on the 
relevance of the request project for the university concerned. The fact that a similar 
project has been developed in a nearby university will obviously be taken into 
account and may be used as an argument to reject it. But there is no procedure for the 
simultaneous examination of all similar requests. Each decision is taken according to 
the specific situation of the university and each request offers an opportunity to 
renegotiate with the Landministerium. 
This decision-making process is encouraged by the two points developed above. 
First, the logic by organisation and the Hochschulreferenten's function: as they 
represent a university, the latter are not in a position to compare the same kind of 
projects. Furthermore, in order to defend 'their' university before other offices that 
could have this synoptical perspective, the best strategy for them16 is to stress the 
excellent and specific characteristics of the project they are defending. Second, the 
absence of academic experts does not permit a transversal view based on disciplines 
. 
 
Targeted Incentives Policy in France / Integrated Actions in Germany 
 
This fourth result could also be presented as a direct consequence of the previous 
ones. In France, because of the relative weakness of the central administration to 
impose changes on the universities, the favourite means of action used by the state 
bodies to steer the system as a whole was, with the exception of the creation of new 
rules, the launching of national incentives policies (Musselin, 1992). Rather than 
case-by-case management and reaching specific arrangements with each university, 
the central administration proposed targeted national orientations in which the 
universities had to integrate their projects to obtain the extra resources allocated for 
these orientations. This could be summed up in slogans such as 'create a magistère17 
and you will have funds for it' or 'renew your first two-year cycles and you will get 
more resources'. This, of course, was used to try to introduce pedagogical 
innovations, but also for more routine cases. For instance, each habilitation 
campaign was used as an opportunity for the Ministry to set its priorities and to 
incite universities to formulate their habilitation projects in a certain way if they 
wanted a positive answer. 
So, reflections on change and initiatives were the prerogative of the State bodies, 
even if the universities could then decide to subscribe to them or not. The definition 
of a general framework and of national norms were then used as a reference for the 
synoptical confrontation and comparison of the projects. 
In Germany, the action of the Länder seems much less divided. The presence of the 
university in the Ministry through the strong links established with the 
Hochschulreferenten and case-by-case decision-making favoured a much more 
integrated and negotiated form of management. 
 
National Styles of Steering Higher Education? 
 
What we tried to show above was that State intervention and the relations of the 
State with the universities present national patterns18. Stable modes of regulation can 
be found behind the diversity of the many interactions between both levels and they 
constitute a framework within which some actions will seem legitimate and others 
not, within which some decisions will be taken and others not, within which some 
actors will be relevant and others not, within which some aspects will be taken into 
account and others not.  
These constants greatly influence the nature and content of the relation between the 
State and the universities. In other words, they reveal interdependencies. For 
instance, the fact that the activity of the French Ministry is built on a logic of 
disciplines and of habilitation of diplomas maintains19 the organisational weakness 
of French universities: they have (had) no incentives to engage in more collective 
action and to develop a stronger shared identity and the best way to obtain resources 
from the Ministry is to present disciplinary projects.  
These modes of regulation also show that the relations between the State and the 
universities are not accidental or due to chance. They have been built over time and 
reflect a balance point between different actors which has a certain continuity. The 
fact that they seem to be a kind of sedimentarisation of the past and that they have 
been built on systemic interdependencies explain why they are rather stable and why, 
when reading the work of historians on higher education, what they describe does 
not sound strange to us but, on the contrary, finds some echo. But this should not 
lead us to believe that the present modes of regulation in national higher education 
systems are determined by the past. In fact, the actors in these configurations 
inherited from the past are not their prisoners: they are only limited by them. That is 
why these configurations can evolve and change if we understand change as follows: 
first, the nature and content of the relations may change (for instance, the 
negotiation-based relations between the Länder and the universities in Germany 
could become weaker or more bureaucratic); second, the logic we have identified in 
the relationships may vary. From this point of view, the analysis of the policy 
developed by the French Ministry as from 1988 seems to be an opportunity for 
change in France20. This is the point we shall develop now. 
 
 Principal Changes Induced by the Contractual Policies  
 
In May 1988, after the re-election of François Mitterrand as President of France, a 
new government was formed under the responsibility of Michel Rocard who made 
education a priority. The Ministry of Education was entrusted to Lionel Jospin who 
was responsible for training from kindergarden to university. He called on Claude 
Allègre, a well-known physicist and long-time friend, to become his Special Adviser 
for Higher Education (Allègre, 1993). In September 1988, the beginning of the 
academic year threatened to be difficult because of the great rise in student numbers. 
Jospin announced to the French Conference of University Presidents (CPU) that he 
wanted to establish a different relationship, emphasising negotiation between the 
State and the universities, and that four-year contracts would therefore be 
implemented between the latter and the central bodies.  
In May 1989, the departments in charge of higher education in the Ministry were 
restructured. One of the new bodies, the DPDU (Direction for the programming and 
the development of universities) was mandated (among other things) to implement 
the policy of funding through negotiation. As such, there is nothing very novel about 
this. In France, new governments always appoint new Ministers who often change 
the previous formal structure. It would take many pages to describe the 'adventures' 
of the links between higher education and the government: at certain periods, it was 
part of the Ministry of Education, at others, it was attached to the Research Ministry. 
Furthermore, many more pages would ensue on the many changes in bodies 
responsible for higher education during the last 20 years. Yet, this time, it was more 
than a mere ritual. It seems to us that the policy of funding through negotiation 
implemented in 1988 was also an attempt to modify the previous form of 
government intervention in French higher education. Obviously, the policy of 
funding through negotiation did not completely reverse the logic of disciplines, the 
presence of the academic profession, synoptical decision-taking and the targeted 
incentives policy. But there were enough changes in certain aspects to speak of a 
new art of government. Let us now present the main changes that occurred and that 
we observed, since we were able to repeat the 1987 study a few years later, in order 
to compare the situations both past and present. Another research study, which 
focused more on the policy of funding through negotiation, completed these first 
efforts21. 
 
What Is Meant by 'Funding through Negotiation'? 
 
As we said above, one of the main objectives of the policy of funding through 
negotiation was to introduce more bargaining relationships between the central 
administration and the universities. But this policy remains above all a state 
initiative. This does not mean that the State wanted to disengage itself: rather, it tried 
to improve the situation and to 'better govern' it. Thus, the change was not a question 
of less interventionism but of replacing traditional ways of acting by new ones. The 
new Ministry therefore decided to extend the contractual relations that had been 
introduced at the beginning of the 1980s to allocate research funds to the 
universities22 to the university budget. For reasons that would be too long to explain 
here, the process of funding through negotiation for the general budget was 
developed separately23 from the research budget. Furthermore, the philosophy and 
objectives of each of these two processes were very different. That is why we shall 
only speak of contracts that do not concern research24. 
The idea behind funding through negotiation was to allocate resources on a different 
basis and to be able (1) to re-balance the situation among the universities and (2) to 
give more leeway without formal decentralisation. Hence, universities were asked to 
analyse their situation and their activities and to define their plans for the next four 
years. Then, the Ministry had to decide which of the priorities defined by the 
university would also be its priority and to negotiate the resources it would allocate 
to enable the university to attain them. So, the Ministry came to distinguish between 
the four-year project of the university (that is, the perspectives of the university, its 
priorities and the action it would develop) and the contract itself (the perspectives, 
priorities and actions recognised by the Ministry and for which it earmarked 
resources that would be allocated in the next four years). This 'contract' was signed 
by the university president and by the Ministry. Obviously, these contracts had no 
legal value. They should be called 'reciprocal commitments' rather than contracts. 
There was no sanction if they were not respected because there was no contingent 
liability to enforce them. Furthermore, in the legal and economic definition of 
contracts, they were to be concluded between parties that were free and equal; both 
these terms are not respected in the present case. Universities were in a way 
subordinated to the state bodies, and even if they could refuse to fund through 
negotiation, it would have been a difficult decision to take25. So it was, in a way, 
more of a symbolic contract. 
 
The Changes Contained in Funding through Negotiation 
 
We would like to describe the kind of changes foreseen and the new practices which 
had to be implemented to achieve these changes26. Thus, we shall develop four 
dimensions of funding through negotiation that clearly show an evolution of the 
modes of intervention we described previously for France. 
Contracts meant, above all, going from the thematic27 to the global. To us, this does 
not mean that the intentions behind funding through negotiation were not targeted 
towards specific goals and that they included all types of considerations, i.e. 
economic, social, financial, pedagogical, scientific, etc. It refers to the fact that the 
various activities within a university are considered with respect to one another, 
rather than in themselves: what is sought is consistency and setting priorities among 
activities. In other words, global consistency prevails over the juxtaposition of 
activities or disciplines. That is why, for the central administration, a 'good' contract 
should rely on a project that is more than a sum of projects: choices have to be made 
and priorities set in order to launch strategic actions. Thus, for instance, in an 
internal document in 1989, a first assessment of the projects sent by 19 universities 
made a distinction between the universities that had 'an evaluation and a university 
project integrating all components and linked to their environment', those that made 
a 'global synthesis of all the sectors of university life but with no critical analysis or 
no internal policy or prospective', those that presented a 'compilation of colleges' and 
those that submitted 'slapdash work, quick sketches or no answers at all'. 
Generally speaking, the people we interviewed were in favour of the emergence of a 
prospective aggregated view of the university rather than a fragmented image. 
“ Some issues were to be found in the project. And we wanted more 
relationships among the colleges so that the project would not be a 
juxtaposition of colleges. The first time I went in this university, it was funny 
because all the deans were there. They were extremely polite and presented to 
me a project that was totally compartmentalized. The president was weak but 
the deans strong. The project was actually 6 projects! I sent it back. I said we 
wanted a common project. ” (a university adviser28) 
 
Another consequence of the prevalence of the global over the thematic was the 
broadening of the spectrum of actions for policy incentives. The latter did not 
disappear29, but they offered greater possibilities and were less centred on targeted 
thematic issues. The state bodies still set priority themes, but they were broader, 
more numerous, and less narrowly defined. A university was not asked to respond to 
each incentive but to select the ones it preferred, the ones it would react to, according 
to its specific situation and the objectives it pursued. However, this orientation 
towards a more open and more diversified incentive funding was not radical. During 
the same period, other policies were launched (such as the reform of the first cycle of 
studies or the creation of IUPs (Vocational University Institutes) that were closer to 
the previous model and were sometimes even in contradiction with the contractual 
policy, as some people told us. 
“ The pedagogical renewal for instance... It swept the contracts away: we told 
the universities 'you have to do that'! ” (DPDU). 
 
“ The idea was to strengthen the president. C. Allègre said 'no more going up 
to the counters (guichets) with an outstretched hand, there is only one partner, 
the president'. There was a strong consensus on this, even if sometimes some 
practices remained directive. But, when the cabinet ignored the 'no counter 
policy', it went wrong. See what happened with the pedagogical reform. ” 
(DPDU). 
 
Funding through negotiation meant reinforcing the powers of the university 
presidency. If a university is no longer a juxtaposition of activities, then the person 
responsible for the whole institution becomes the privileged partner at the expense of 
the deans. The latter can no longer come to Paris to defend themselves, bypassing the 
president or even acting against him. 
“ We strengthened the presidents but the deans have been neglected by the 
central administration. It was all the more the case when the presidents 
themselves neglected their deans. It is clear. This policy recognizes only the 
university and the president. ” (DPDU). 
 
The presidents' duty is to give consistency to their university, to help it to define a 
line of action, in other words, to be a little more managerial30, to be able, not only to 
represent their universities, but also to negotiate compromises, to integrate different 
constraints, to set priorities. 
Governing through contracts and seeking integration thus modified the relational 
habits of the central administration. It reduced the number of relevant partners and 
prevented (at least a little) one from playing on the internal disputes within 
universities and setting power on the discrete allocation of resources by office 
managers. 
Funding through negotiation also meant modifying the process of resource 
allocation. One can see these new practices as a consequence of the search for the 
global. If universities are more than the simple sum of their activities, then their 
budget can no longer be the simple sum of the amount of resources allocated to each 
activity. The policy of funding through negotiation thus led to a reconsideration of 
the way positions and budgets were attributed, at the time when the Rocard 
government made education a priority and when the number of students, as from 
1988, increased so suddenly that the State was obliged to take specific measures in 
favour of higher education31. The question then was how to allocate extra resources, 
while rebalancing the situation among the universities32. 
Two decisions were taken at the time. The first concerned the composition of the 
university budget: one part was allocated automatically on criteria33, but the other 
was the result of the contractual negotiation. On average, for all of France, the 
contractual budget represented only 5% of the total budget34, but one should bear in 
mind that this did not include salaries and that the creation of new positions was 
another important element of the negotiation until 1994. The second innovation 
concerned lump-sum budgets. The universities received resources (and no longer a 
budget for each curriculum) that they could then use as they wished. 
Last, funding through negotiation meant less opacity and more confidence. The 
practices we just described induced a change in the content and quality of the 
relations between the central administration and the universities. The contracts35 
contradicted the relational pattern that M. Crozier (1964) and later F. Dupuy and J.-
C. Thoenig (1983) presented as characteristic of the French administration. In order 
to fund through negotiation, it was less relevant than before to let problems be dealt 
with by an isolated state agency or to conceal local arrangements. On the contrary, 
universities had a new interest in giving more information about their situation, in 
bringing to light their specificities. It was better for them to become more 
transparent. Thus, for instance, in the three universities in which we studied the 
effects of funding through negotiation (Lipiansky & Musselin, 1995), the faculty 
members we interviewed explained that, as a consequence of the contracts, it made 
sense to ask for 20,000 francs in order to obtain 10,000, either from their university 
or from the Ministry. 
“ The contractual mode is more credible. As we know how much the university 
will receive in the next four years, we have no reason to ask for unnecessary 
positions. We have reduced our requirements; we rationalized our requests for 
new positions. Next year for instance, as I know what we can have, I will only 
ask for two positions (.. .) We adapt ourselves. We will examine the needs and 
the university council and the scientific body, we will decide where the priority 
is (...) As a matter of fact, we are ourselves doing the regulation. I think it was 
one of the goals of the Ministry. ” (a dean). 
 
Thus, even if globality gives more autonomy of choice to the universities, it also 
paradoxically strengthens the influence of the central administration, which thus has 
a better knowledge of what happens in the units. All those who worked in the state 
agencies before 1988 stressed this aspect. 
“ It was an innovation. We went into the universities. Before the presidents 
called the rue Dutot36 'the crying office' and 'the counters (guichets)'. They 
went to the counter to get a few francs. Some of them came every week, others 
were never there. It has been an innovation for the agents of the rue Dutot to 
see the universities from inside. They received an electroshock because what 
they saw before from far away had another aspect in the reality. They 
discovered another way of acting. The same holds true for the universities: they 
saw State agents coming not as a delegation but as colleagues! ” (DPDU). 
 
In order to contractualise, the universities had to accept to shed light on their 
situation and the state bodies had to take greater account of this. On this basis, more 
trustful relationships developed: the good will of the centre was not only written in 
the documents, it also appeared in practices that convinced enough people in the 
universities to accept the new rules of the game imposed by the central 
administration. This trust37 was reinforced by the fact that the contracts were 
generally respected. Even if the new positions foreseen in the contract were not 
always created in the grades or in the categories wished for by the university, the 
central administration generally kept its promises (at least until 199338). Thus, 
relations with the Ministry generally improved39. The day-to-day contacts remained 
the same, but the academics and the administrators who participated in the 
preparation of the contracts spoke of the Ministry in terms that were unheard of 
before. Relations with the DPDU agents were described in warm terms and 
expressions such as 'collaboration' 'capacity to listen' or 'comprehension'. The 
universities greatly appreciated that the Paris staff came to them and witnessed de 
visu the problems they faced. The disappearance of habits that favoured the 
academics who were able to impose themselves or to go to Paris was also 
appreciated. 
“ I do think it is a very good tool. It is better than to go to Paris—presidents 
were obliged to knock at the different doors—and to be in the favour of a 
mister X or Y! It was a struggle for resources. It was clientelism. One would 
knock on one door then another. The contract allows us to develop our own 
project and to help the universities that have a project. ” (a dean). 
 
It seems to us that this description of the concrete objectives of funding through 
negotiation and the new practices that supported it show that what we presented as 
the main characteristics of state intervention in higher education in France must be 
revised. In fact, funding through negotiation affected the two dimensions we defined 
as change: the nature and content of the relations between the State and the 
universities on the one side and the logics of actions on the other. In a way, the 
intervention of the French state bodies came closer to the actions of their German 
counterparts, even if it was still centralised: they paid more attention to the 
universities than to the disciplines than before, they took decisions more on a case-
by-case basis (each university being a specific case), they promoted more integrated 
priorities. All this leads us to say that funding through negotiation was not so much 
another public policy on higher education as a redefinition of what universities are 
(or should be) and of the place of state regulation in the higher education system. 
The role of the central agencies also evolved: less importance was given to the 
definition of national rules that were to be implemented everywhere than to 
possibilities for differentiation among the universities within a national framework. 
 
The Limits Met by Funding through Negotiation 
 
In the previous section, we tried to show that funding through negotiation had 
introduced new dynamics. We must now put this hypothesis into perpective and try 
to analyse the limits of this policy. At the moment (1996), the general diagnosis is 
that funding through negotiation has been frozen since the second co-habitation in 
1993. But this explanation that reduces the problems to political factors seems too 
simplistic to us. Of course, we shall not deny that the political changes that occurred 
in 1993 had no effect. But problems were also to be found in the learning process 
that such a new orientation implied and in the emergence of new issues. So we shall 
first describe some of the difficulties caused by the contracts in the universities and 
some of the unforeseen effects they had on the central agencies before coming back 
to political factors. 
 
It Is Easier to Prepare University Projects than to Implement Them 
 
In 1994, we carried out a comparative study (Lipiansky & Musselin, 1995) on the 
effects of funding through negotiation in three universities40. It is not possible to 
present all the results of this work which focused on the preparation and 
implementation of the contracts, so we shall concentrate on the aspects that show the 
difficulty of learning to act collectively. 
 
The problem of collective action first appeared in the preparation of the contracts 
and we have stressed great differences among the universities in this phase. The role 
of the president, but also of the deans and of the administrative staff, was crucial 
here. Most of them saw that the contracts could mean more resources and accepted 
to play the game, but they rarely foresaw that funding through negotiation could also 
be a way of mobilising reflection, redefining the missions and setting priorities 
among them, in other words, of managing differently. In the three universities we 
studied, the more the presidency had an instrumental understanding of the contract, 
the less a vast, long-term and iterative negotiation within their university was 
engaged. The collective project was sometimes the result of very isolated reflection. 
The internal rapport de force at the time when funding through negotiation was 
introduced was also difficult to manage. The contract never succceded in bypassing 
the existing cleavages: it was not able to modify the attitudes of the colleges, it even 
suffered from them. For instance, strong colleges41 resisted the wish of their 
president to include them in a university project, arguing that they were too specific 
to join in a common project. 
Yet, working together on the preparation of a collective project, even if not easy, 
generally succeeded in introducing, or at least in launching a global dynamic within 
the university. But even then, the movement engaged during the preparation phase 
and the needs it revealed slowed down during the implementation phase. 
Implementing a collective project was not spontaneous. Let us give a few examples. 
When they prepared the project, the universities became aware that they did not 
know themselves and that data were lacking on elementary aspects (about the 
evolution of the student population for instance) needed to analyse the situation and 
to decide on future projects. But after the signature of the contract, they often did not 
succced in implementing mechanisms42 that would enable them to continue to 
collect and update data. 
The collecting of data on the university for the preparation phase also made the 
faculty members aware of the imbalance within their university and the need to re-
balance. In fact, such data were subsequently used to reject certain requests from 
relatively rich colleges or departments that had a hard time to legitimate their needs. 
But, if this affected the allocation of new resources, it only rarely led to the 
redistribution of existing means. 
We reach the same conclusion if we consider operations scheduled in the contract 
that required cooperation among different colleges, departments or groups: they were 
also very difficult to implement. It was difficult to transform the enthusiasm and the 
good will that prevailed during the preparation of the contract into concrete action. 
Hence, the contracts and their implementation often showed the incapacity of 
universities to act more collectively and develop internal synergies43. 
 
Funding through Negotiation also Had Feedback on the Central Administration 
 
The contractual policy also suffered from the problems the central administration 
had in managing the process. In fact, the authors of the contractual policy did not 
seem very aware of the consequences it could have on the central administration. 
They did not see that the change in the relations between Paris and the universities 
would also change the relations between the universities and Paris. 
Two different levels of consequences can be distinguished. The first concerns 
internal issues: the redistribution of power within the central agencies44 on the one 
hand, and the need for new skills45 on the other. The second level concerns the 
regulation of the whole system. So long as nobody took into account the specificity 
of each university, it was possible to seek national harmony, to theoretically use the 
same criteria and to implement the same rules. This kind of regulation relied on the 
ediction of norms that were the same for the whole country and that were supposed 
to respond to the general interest. Adjustments obviously occurred at the margin: 
everybody knows that it is virtually impossible to apply equal treatment, but 
everybody deals with this issue. 
Funding through negotiation breaks this down. The central administration faces a 
new problem: how far are the general principles and rules compatible with the 
recognition46 of specificities? In theory, the boundaries are clear: state agencies 
define the goals, make choices and set the rules with which and in the limit of which 
universities may deal with situations that are more diverse than before. In practice, it 
seems much more difficult. First, universities react to the given framework, either by 
bypassing or extending it. The framework itself can never be defined clearly enough 
and therefore it is also subject to interpretations, negotiations and adjustments. 
Moreover, it can be in contradiction with local specificities. Furthermore, the 
framework may be modified by political change, by the bargaining between the 
directorates themselves and, of course, by the interplay between the central 
administration and the universities. 
 
More Political Factors 
 
We shall now analyse political aspects that also opposed the whole process. It scems 
to us that the second cohabitation was another threat for funding through negotiation 
for two reasons. 
First, the new Government decided to reduce the growth of the budgets when the 
number of students was still increasing. In November 1993, the new Ministry 
announced that the engagement on faculty positions included in the contracts would 
not be respected. This doubly endangered the contracts. It revealed their fragility and 
their reversibility, as well as the absence of contingent liabilities to enforce the 
respect of the terms. At the same time, it destroyed the basis on which funding 
through negotiation had been developed that, in the case of higher education, linked 
the contracts to the allocation of more resources and not to the negotiation of 
restrictions (cf. note 32). 
The second reason concerns what the Ministry included in the term 'contract'. We 
tried to show above that the objectives embodied in funding through negotiation 
were manifold: to better allocate resources, to develop a new kind of relation 
between the State and the universities, to create an internal dynamic within 
universities. That seems47 to have happened after 1993 is a change in the meaning of 
funding through negotiation. The contract became a management tool: the 
information required was much more formalised, its content was restricted... In a 
sense, the contracts were diverted. 
 
Some Conclusions on Changing the Relation between the State and 
the Universities 
 
In the second part of this article, we tried to explain why we consider that the 
funding through negotiation policy introduced some changes in the French national 
pattern of higher education and to present some of its limits. To conclude, we would 
like to present some reflections on what we learned from this about changing the 
relations between the State and the universities. 
First, we can say that this policy did not avoid the traditional problems met by the 
change process: the perenniality of change and the risk of bureaucratisation through 
institutionalisation. The perenniality was all the more a central issue that one of the 
characteristics of the French higher education system was that actors had a high 
turnover. This is true for the political actors. Lionel Jospin was in office for four 
years: it is not long to manage a long-term process (even if four years is a long time 
in this position, compared to his predecessors). His successor (Jack Lang) remained 
one year and François Fillon, two. This is also true for the staff of the central 
agencies48 (Friedberg & Musselin, 1993), for the university presidents (they are 
elected for five years and only one mandate) and for the university bodies. This 
turnover is all the more a problem that, as we explained above, the personal 
implication of the actors is very important in the process. The transmission of 
experience between presidents is usually not organised and in two of the three 
universities that had a new president, he was less involved, less entreprising than his 
predecessor. May be the electors wanted a break after a period of internal moves. 
The thinning (in resources and in meaning) of the contracts as from 1993 can be seen 
as a consequence of the will to perennialise the contracts through more 
formalisation. The transformation of the contract into a management tool was the 
consequence of an attempt to harmonise the forms sent to the universities to prepare 
their next contracts. Formalisation is generally a difficult step for innovation because 
it limits the possible options: and so it was in this case too. But this case also 
contains more specific aspects. For instance, it raises the question about who can 
provoke change in the public higher education system. In the case of France, it seems 
that universities can become more autonomous only if the State decides/ allows this. 
As we tried to show, funding through negotiation changed the logic of intervention 
of the State in France, but it did not weaken the influence of the State on them. This 
is the ambiguity of such contracts: they can allow greater differentiation but they are 
also a kind of recentralisation from the centre: the latter defines (at least at the 
beginning of such a process) how far differentiation can go, what content it can have, 
etc. 
So, control over the universities remained strong and when the state agencies 
changed the rules of the game, as from 1993, they were not able to resist. Changing 
the relationships with the State seemed so very dependent on the good will of the 
State. In a recent book, a French philosopher (Renaut, 1995) explains the situation of 
French universities by the fact that, if they succeeded a first modernisation in the 
Middle Ages when they became free from the clerical control, they did not achieve 
the second modernisation that would have meant becoming free from the State. The 
case we studied clearly confirmed this dependence, even if funding through 
negotiation could represent a step in this direction in the long-term. 
The last point we would like to mention about changing the relations between the 
State and the universities is that it has to do with the university's capacity for change. 
The limits met by funding through negotiation also concerned the organisation of the 
universities: the fact that, within them, interactions are loosely coupled and that the 
autonomy of faculty members is great can explain why transforming the contracts 
into acts has been so difficult. Everybody thought that the dynamic of the contract 
would transform itself into a dynamic for collective action. But changing the 
relations between the State and the universities involved learning processes that 
should not be neglected, especially in such specific organisations. 
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1 Negotiations for the recruitment of new faculty take place at three levels. First, with the recruiting 
university, second with the minister of the Land (of the recruiting university), and last with the 
candidate's own university. 
2  We are now completing these analyses by field work on the functioning of some disciplines and on 
their interplay with the State and the universities. Hence, we are trying to study different academic 
market-places (Musselin, 1996). 
3  Yet, the latter pay great attention to higher education and are intervening to a greater extent in the 
financing of higher education (Filâtre, 1993), despite the 1982 law! 
4  In France, most diplomas are 'national'. When a faculty member wants to create a new course that 
will be sanctioned by a national diploma (for instance, a DEUG, a Licence or a Maîtrise), he must 
write a project and submit it to the Ministry which then decides if it corresponds to the model that 
defines the minimal content of a specific type of diploma in a specific subdiscipline. This course is 
then habilité (officially agreed upon). This is the procedure we shall call habilitation in this article. 
5  The budget allocated to the universities was calculated through a programme allocation process 
called GARACES. For a precise description of this process and a critical analysis of its effects, see 
the report by Y. Fréville (1981). A more positive description of GARACES was given in an article 
written by one of its main instigators, G. Allain (1986). 
6  It only concerns 'purely' university research, as opposed to research carried out in institutes which 
are part of national research institutions, such as the CNRS, INRA, INSERM. After an evaluation 
by peers, some university institutes become 'associated' with one of these research institutions: 
they have a four-year renewable contract, may use the label of the institution and receive resources 
(budget and positions) from it. But other university teams only receive public funds from the DR. 
7  Except in the DR that had its own logic. 
8  In France, university studies are divided into three cycles. The first lasts two years and generally 
leads to the DEUG. The second also lasts two years: the first year leads to the Licence and the 
second to the Maîtrise. Then, students may enter a third cycle of studies, generally in order to 
obtain a DESS or a DEA after a further year's study. If they obtain the latter, they are entitled to 
study for a doctorate. 
9  What we mean by this is that, in German universities, there is not the competition of the Grandes 
Ecoles in the training of the elites, that they still are the result of the Humboldtian tradition (while 
                                                                                                                                          
French universities have only existed in their present form since 1969) and that they are less 
fragmented than the French universities. 
10  We should of course nuance this for each Land we studied. In Niedersachsen and Bade 
Wurremberg, the interactions followed his pattern In Nordrhein-Wesfalie, this pattern was not as 
strong because the offices that manage the resources were trying to establish direct contacts with 
the universities and were beginning to weaken the position of the Hochschulreferenten. 
11  That means that with each ministerial change the names of the experts change! 
12  Administrative chief executives are often chosen among faculty members. They had generally 
been university presidents. They also change when there is a ministerial change. In this case, they 
may return to their university as a 'normal' faculty member. 
13  The problem is that these experts are not representative of the profession: they are not elected, and 
their 'choice' is always a mix between partisan and scientific reward. 
14  The university itself finds some resources (mostly by redistributing) to make an offer but, when it 
fears it will not be sufficient to be attractive, it asks the ministry for financial help. 
15  As an example, let us quote this extract from an interview: 
“ For the last recruitment procedures, we advertised 2,200 positions to which 14,000 
candidates applied. We organised 127 juries (...) There were two referees for each candidate 
and we sent the publications of each candidate to their referees. It meant managing 28,000 
mailings. ” 
16  Another realistic strategy for them is to avoid projects that are difficult to defend: that is one of the 
reasons why they encourage the faculty members and the university staff to inform them about any 
possible future project at a very early stage so as to estimate its chances of success. 
17  A new national diploma created in 1985. 
18  At first, this came as a surprise to us in the case of Germany: we expected greater differences 
between the Länder. They exist of course: for instance, the content of the higher education policy 
in each Land we studied was rather different. So too was the formal organisation of each Ministry. 
Yet, we found the points we describe here in each of them! In the conclusion of our book 
(Friedberg & Musselin, 1993), we put forward some hypotheses on how these federal regularities 
can emerge and distinguish between different kinds of coordination mechanisms (formal, market-
like and normative) among the Länder. 
19  We say 'maintains' in order to avoid either 'is due to' or 'is the cause for'. We do not know which 
was the consequence of the other. We can only offer the following hypothesis: as state agencies 
developed by the end of the 1950s/ early 1960s at a time when the specialised colleges were the 
backbone of the French university system, they probably reproduced discipline-based organisation 
and logic that they maintained after the Faure Law (1968) which instituted pluridisciplinary 
universities in France. 
20 On the contrary, I would analyse the reunification of Germany as a strengthening of the modes of 
regulation that existed in West Germany before, as they have been literally 'transferred' to East 
Germany. Of course, this does not mean that the general context has not changed because of the 
reunification (number of students, opportunities for recruitment, budgets allocated, etc. . . . ) but 
the patterns of the interactions between the State, the universities and the profession remained the 
same. Yet, the ongoing active discussions on rhe German higher education system could lead to a 
change of patterns. 
21  A first in-depth study based on some 80 interviews was conducted in 1987. Then, a graduate 
student conducted interviews and wrote a report on the same topic in 1991 (Sanchez, 1991). These 
two research works were presented in the book E. Friedberg and I published in 1993. In 1994 and 
1995, I held other interviews with the main actors of the contractual policy and analysed many 
internal documents in order to reconstruct the emergence of this policy (Musselin, 1995). With S. 
Lipiansky, I also studied the effects of funding through negotiation in three universities (Lipiansky 
and Musselin, 1995). 
22  Every four years, the research teams within a university write a scientific project for the next four 
years. Scientific experts in the central administration examine them and decide whether to allocate 
them specific resources or not. Until 1989, a global amount was attributed to the president of the 
university concerned who could then redistribute the money among the research teams. As from 
1989, the amount of resources was decided at the central level (Paris) so that the university level 
could not modify the distribution of resources among the research teams. 
23  It means that each university had a four-year research contract and a four-year 'all but research' 
contract. Each of these contracts was not signed at the same time and was not negotiated by the 
same directorates and according to the same procedure. 
24  The differences between the four-year research contracts and the 'all but research' ones clearly 
show that funding through negotiation was not in itself an instrument for change: it depended on 
                                                                                                                                          
how it was implemented. It is not the contract in itself that gives more leeway to the universities: it 
is the process by which it is prepared, the margin for negotiation that is offered (Berrivin, 1995) . 
25  Only one university did not sign a contract. But the decision also came from the central agencies 
that considered that the project of this university was not good enough. More generally, the 
problem of signing if the project is not good (from the central agencies' point of view) has been 
discussed in the Ministry. In fact, except for the case mentioned previously, they preferred to sign 
a contract, even if it was not satisfactory, in the hope that it would ultimately launch a dynamic that 
would develop. 
26  For the presentation of the objectives of the contractual policy and a discussion on their effects on 
the central administration and on the pattern of French state intervention see Berrivin and Musselin 
(1996). 
27  Under 'thematic', we include every policy centred on one discipline, or on one cycle of study or on 
one problem area. 'Global' means that many aspects must be taken into accounts, especially the 
different components of a university and their interrelations 
28  These are a small number of faculty members working for the DPDU, who have generally been 
presidents or vice-presidents before. They are responsible for a small number of universities in a 
geographical sector and must give them methodological assistance in the elaboration of the project 
and the negotiation of the contract. We do not have the space to go into details about their role, but 
they have been very important in the whole process. 
29  In a way, funding through negotiation means 'contractualize and you will get more positions.' 
30  One should not conclude from this that the Ministry wanted to transform the universities into firms 
and their presidents into executives. There is never any question about this in the internal 
documents or in the interviews. But if the presidents had to acquire new skills, it raised once more 
the question of the professionalisation of this function and of the transmisson of experience 
between them (they are elected for a five-year mandate which is not renewable). The training of 
presidents is also in question. 
31  Other decisions were taken in the same direction: salaries and career prospects for faculty 
members were improved, the University 2000 plan was launched, positions were created on a large 
scale ... 
32  This increase in resources is generally presented as a sine qua non condition for the success of the 
contractual policy. Yet, in some other public sectors, contracts have been accepted and negotiated 
on retrenchments. 
33  The computer programme that calculates the 'on criteria' was modified: GARACES was 
abandoned in favour of SANREMO. 
34  According to those we interviewed, this percentage was not decided a priori but a posteriori. A 
few years later, the agents in charge of funding through negotiation in the Ministry asked to 
contract 10% of the budget, but did not obtain satisfaction. 
35  In the case of higher education, we showed that the contracts were a new means of intervention. 
Yet, contracts are not a solution in themselves. The way they are implemented, their content, the 
areas they cover, etc. have an impact on the success of such a policy and may lead to very different 
results. Comparing contractual policies at the Equipement and in EDF-GDF, R. Berrivin (1995) 
concluded that contracts were an issue that had to be managed and not a solution in themselves. 
36  Most of the directorates responsible for higher education are located in this street in Paris. 
37  Many people were skeptical about the contractual policy and saw it as a demagogic attempt to 
enforce the large rise in student numbers. But this skepticism did not provoke opposition or 
debates. It can even be said that it did not give rise to controversy. 
38  The weakness of this policy appeared with the political change of 1993: budget retrenchments led 
to the non-respect of the creation of positions and the new Minister Fillon decided that there would 
be no more engagement; about the positions in the next contracts. During the studies we led in 
three universities in 1994 (Lipiansky & Musselin, 1995), many academics spoke of betrayal. They 
felt 'they had been tricked', as they accepted growth in student numbers in 'exchange' for more 
resources... which they did not receive. 
39  Relations with the Ministry vary in quality from one university to another (Lipiansky & Musselin, 
1995). 
40  In each university we conducted some 30 interviews with those who prepared and implemented the 
contracts, as well as with Deans, members of university bodies, administrators, faculty members . 
41  In France, many universities are not pluridisciplinary and consist of two large colleges (e.g. one of 
law and the other of medicine) that each develops its autonomy vis-à-vis the other and vis-à-vis the 
president. 
42  In one of the three universities we studied, someone had been recruited especially for this function 
but the good will of the colleges during the preparatory phase disappeared after the signature and 
                                                                                                                                          
the colleges became very reluctant to transmit information on their activities. 
43  This can obviously be analysed as a consequence of the special organisational characteristics of 
universities (Cohen et al., 1972; Weick, 1976; Musselin, 1987) . It can also be analysed as a 
classical problem (see, for instance, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) for public policy: the 
Ministry as well as the university president generally considered that the signature of the contract 
(i.e. the decision) was equivalent to 'being achieved' and neglected the implementation phase. We 
developed this point in a recent paper (Musselin, 1997) . 
44  As long as the central administration acted thematically, the quasi-absence of relationships 
between the directorates (Musselin & Brisset, 1989) was not a real problem. But, this does not fit 
in at all with a policy which seeks integration. The creation of a directorate which is able to 
integrate different aspects and to coordinate different actions did not occur 'naturally'. The conflict 
that arose between the DESUP and the DPDU handicapped the process. 
45  Until then, it principally needed agents who could produce and interpret rules. This continued but 
other skills were also required to lead, coordinate, give assistance for mediation and dissemination, 
as well as to manage the new process, integrate the different aspects of a contract, develop new 
relations with the universities, support them, provide information about recent innovations in some 
universities. 
46  We can wonder whether the recent evolution is characterised by greater specificities (that in fact 
have existed for a long time) or by the recognition, or even the enhancement of diversity and 
specificity. 
47  We do not base these assumptions on an empirical field study but on informal talks with university 
or central agencies administrators, presidents and faculty members. 
48  For instance, the DPDU had three directors between 1989 and 1993. 
